We discuss the role of two fundamental assumptions locality and realism in Bell's considerations. We demonstrated that by deriving an analogue of Bell's inequality for conditional probabilities it is possible to prove directly (i.e., without appealing to the locality assumption) that Bellian realism is incompatible with quantum mechanics
Introduction
We analyse the role of two fundamental assumptions, namely, realism and locality in considerations of J. Bell [1] . It is demonstrated that the assumption of locality has nothing to do with considerations based on inequalities for probabilities. The really fundamental assumption is only Bell's realism.
We underline that Bellian realism is, in fact, the very special model of realism, see [2] - [4] for discussions.
J. Bell identified the possibility of a realist description with the existence of a single Kolmogorov probability space K such that physical observables under consideration (e.g., three spin projections) can be represented by random variables on K. Such a realism can be called Bell-Kolmogorov realism, cf. with individual realism [3] , [4] .
J. Bell demonstrated that the Bell-Kolmogorov realism is incompatible with quantum mechanics [1] . This was his great contribution in foundations of quantum mechanics. However, by using the EPR-Bohm experimental framework J. Bell appealed to the locality assumption. As we have already mentioned, the latter assumption need not be used to prove that the BellKolmogorov realism is incompatible with quantum mechanics. We show this in the following way.
By starting (as J. Bell did) with the Bell-Kolmogorov realism we derive an analogue of Bell's inequality but for conditional probabilities, Theorem 2. In fact, this theorem is a simple corollary of the well known Wigner inequality [5] , see Theorem 1, see also [2] ("Bell's inequality for probabilities").
To found conditional probabilities by using quantum formalism we need to find eigenvectors of corresponding operators. Of course, such eigenvectors can be found and the scalar product of those vectors can be formed even for incompatible observables, e.g., spin projections. Therefore we need not use pairs of correlated particles. It is sufficient to consider an ensemble of singlets. Practically by repeating Bell's arguments (but by using conditional probabilities) we demonstrate that the Bell-Kolmogorov realism is incompatible with quantum mechanics but without to appeal to locality argument or the EPR-Bohm experiment.
Since the fundamental assumption of locality was totally eliminated from our considerations, it seems that Bell's approach did not give so much for understanding of foundations of quantum mechanics. Heisenberg, Bohr, von Neumann, ..., Kochen-Specker, ..., presented various arguments on incompatibility of quantum mechanics and the realist description. I think that the fundamental contribution of J. Bell was understanding that the realist description is impossible for three physical observables.
Since the Heisenberg uncertainty principle is about two incompatible observables it would be natural to suppose that the realist description is impossible even for two quantum observables. And only in the Bell inequality the number -three -of incompatible random variables played the cruicial role. 1 Surprising recent result [6] is that for two incompatible variables the realist description is always possible. By [6] quantum theory (at least its statistical part) is based on two realist observables (e.g., the position and the momentum), but other observables (even combinations of the position and the momentum) need not have realist counterparts.
Another fundamental contribution of J. Bell was the presenting of the rigorous mathematical definition of realism, namely Bell-Kolmogorov realism. We would like to remark that Bellian realism does not coincide with the EPR-realism. Of course, EPR did not give the precise definition of realism. But EPR's sufficient condition of reality need not be based on a single Kolmogorov probability space. "Probability one" might be regarded to various probability spaces. Moreover, the paper [7] of A. Einstein, B. Podolsky, N. Rosen was published just two years after the publication of the book [8] of A. N. Kolmogorov. Thus I do not think that A. Einstein, B. Podolsky, N. Rosen had in mind the Kolmogorov model at all. In principle we may consider EPR-probabilities as (von Mises [9] ) frequency probabilities. If we define realism not as the Bell-Kolmogorov realism, but as the frequency realism [10] then we can obtain the EPR-Bohm correlation functions in the (local) realist framework [10] .
Inequality for conditional probabilities in
Bellian realists framework 2.1. Bellian realism We start with recalling Bell's definition of realism. Let O = {a, b, . . . c} be a system of physical observables. This system permits realist description if there exists a Kolmogorov probability space K = (Ω, F , P) such that all observables belonging to O can be represented by random variables on K.
We recall that conditional probabilities in the Kolmogorov model are defined by the Bayes' formula:
Wigner inequality
We shall use the following simple mathematical result: Theorem 1. ("Bell's inequality for probabilities") Let a, b, c = ±1 be arbitrary dichotomous random variables on a single Kolmogorov space K. Then the following inequality holds true.
The proof of this theorem in purely mathematical framework can be found e.g., in my book [2] , p. 89-90. However, the inequality (1) is, in fact, the well known version of Bell's inequality obtained by Wigner in 1970, see [5] . Moreover, Wigner proved this inequality in the same general probabilistic framework as we used in Theorem 1, i.e., without referring to correlated particles and so on. However, then he applied (1) to the EPR-Bohm experiment for correlated particles. It is easy to see that (1) is violated for an approriative choice of spin projectors, see [5] (or [2] ).
2.3. Inequality for conditional probabilities. As a simple consequence of Theorem 1 we obtain: Theorem 2. ("Bell's inequality for conditional probabilities"). Let a, b, c = ±1 be dichotomous symmetrically distributed random variables on a single Kolmogorov space. Then the following inequality holds true:
Proof. We have
Thus
and P(a = +1/c = +1) = 2P(a = +1, c = +1).
Hence by (1) we get (2). We underline again that the main distinguishing feature of (2) is the presence of only conditional probabilities. Conditional probabilities can always be calculated by using quantum formalism. In fact, we need not consider pairs of particles, since conditional probabilities are well defined even for singlet quantum systems.
The impossibility of realist description of spin projections of singlet systems
We use Bell's definition of realism. Suppose (as J. Bell did) that the Bellian realist description can be used for spin 1 2 system. Thus all spin projections can be represented by random variables on a single Kolmogorov space K.
We consider a family of spin projections: σ(θ) = cos θσ z + sin θσ x , where σ x , σ z are Pauli matrices, θ ∈ [0, 2π).
Bellian realism implies that we can apply the inequality (2) to any three spin projectors σ(θ 1 ), σ(θ 2 ), σ(θ 3 ):
≥ P(σ(θ 1 ) = +1/σ(θ 3 ) = +1).
As always we can compute conditional probabilities by using quantum formalism. If we have two dichotomous observables A and B then
where {e Thus P(σ(θ 1 ) = +1/σ(θ 2 ) = +1) = cos 2 θ 1 − θ 2 2 , P(σ(θ 3 ) = +1/σ(θ 2 ) = −1) = sin 2 θ 3 − θ 2 2 , P(σ(θ 1 ) = +1/σ(θ 3 ) = +1) = cos 2 θ 1 − θ 3 2 .
By (3) we have
We take θ 1 = 0, θ 2 = 6α, θ 3 = 2α and we get the following trigonometric inequality: cos 2 3α + sin 2 2α ≥ cos 2 α.
